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Introduction
Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), The American Society of Composers,
Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP), and the cable television industry
have been fighting over the price of music. Specifically, the dispute cen-
ters on the blanket licenses issued by BMI and ASCAP to cable compa-
nies. These licenses authorize the cable companies to transmit all
musical compositions that BMI and ASCAP control.
BMI argues that during the past twenty years, while the cable indus-
try was developing, BMI allowed it to use music in BMI's repertoire at
bargain rates.' Now that cable has become extremely profitable, BMI
believes that owners of copyrighted music used in cable programming
should receive a larger percentage of the cable industry's profits.2
BMI attempted to increase its profits from cable television by insist-
ing that previously unlicensed basic cable programmers purchase a blan-
ket license.3 BMI also tried to increase fees paid by pay cable
programmers.4 Finally, BMI attempted to require cable operators, who
previously were partially covered by licenses paid by pay cable program-
mers, to purchase separate licenses.5
There is no indication that ASCAP followed BMI's lead in trying to
license basic cable programmers. However, ASCAP did make an at-
tempt to substantially increase the fee paid by a pay cable programmer.6
ASCAP also litigated the right to acquire separate licensing agreements
with cable operators.7
Cable programmers and operators resisted BMI's and ASCAP's de-
mands for a larger share of the cable industry profits, and to some degree
they were successful. The fee that ASCAP received as a result of litiga-
tion with the pay cable programmer was not substantially more than that
paid in the past.8 The courts also found that neither ASCAP nor BMI
1. See Home Box Office Sued to Prevent Use of BMI Music Without License, PR New-
swire, Dec. 28, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File [hereinafter HBO Sued];
see also Appleson, BMI, Cable Industry Play Discord in Court, THE REUTER BUSINESS RE-
PORT, Feb. 13, 1990.
2. See HBO Sued, supra note 1; see also Appleson, supra note 1.
3. Complaint at 27-28, National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, No. 90-0209, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11389 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991). See infra notes 33-36 (explanation of the difference
between cable programmers and cable operators).
4. Id. at 25.
5. Id. at 32-34.
6. See ASCAP v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, 912 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1990).
7. See United States v. ASCAP, Civ. No. 13-95, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10033 (S.D.N.Y.
July 11, 1991) (In re Turner Broadcasting System).
8. See Showtime/The Movie Channel, 912 F.2d at 571. The rate court based its determi-
nation of a reasonable fee for ASCAP's blanket license on BMI's current blanket license fee for
Showtime. Id.
19911
could require cable operators to purchase blanket licenses for program-
ming supplied by cable programmers. 9 However, these were small victo-
ries for the cable industry.
Cable programmers and operators have been unsuccessful in their
attack on blanket licenses in general.1" The cable companies claimed
that BMI was demanding unreasonable fees for its blanket licenses. 1
Consequently, BMI and the cable programmers and operators were un-
able to negotiate acceptable license agreements and, in some instances,
the cable companies were operating without them. 2 BMI brought multi-
ple copyright infringement suits against such cable programmers and op-
erators.13  Several cable companies either counterclaimed or brought
separate actions against BMI claiming violation of an existing consent
decree, antitrust violations, and misuse of copyright.' 4 The court in one
of these actions found in favor of BMI on all issues except the ability to
license cable operators.' 5 The cable companies filed an appeal but even-
tually settled.' 6 The other cases also settled. 17
This note will focus primarily on the dispute between BMI and the
cable programmers and operators. ASCAP has been less active than
BMI in pursuing increased profits from the cable industry because it is
restricted by provisions in a consent decree to which BMI is not subject.
Specifically, ASCAP is required to grant a blanket license to all appli-
cants, and if a fee cannot be negotiated, then a rate court will determine a
reasonable fee.'" As a result, BMI has more bargaining power in negoti-
9. United States v. ASCAP, Civ. No. 13-95, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10033, at *100
(S.D.N.Y. July 11, 1991) (In re Turner Broadcast System); National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI,
Nos. 90-0209, 90-0262, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11389, at *125 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
10. See United States v. ASCAP, Civ. No. 13-95, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10033, at *100
(S.D.N.Y. July 11, 1991) (In re Turner Broadcast System); see also National Cable TV Ass'n v.
BMI, Nos. 90-0209, 90-0262, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11389, at *125 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
11. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for a Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction Relief at 2-3 n. 1, National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, No. 90-
0209, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11389 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
12. See, e.g., Third Amended and Supplemental Verified Complaint at 10-11, BMI v.
HBO, No. 89 Civ. 8579 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 15, 1990).
13. Complaint at 29, National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, No. 90-0209, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11389 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
14. See, e.g., Id.
15. National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, Nos. 90-0209, 90-0262, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11389, at *125, 138 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
16. National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, Nos. 90-0209, 90-0262, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13149, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 24, 1991) (granting a stay of the enforcement of the judgment
pending outcome of the appeal); telephone interview with Charles Lozow of Hughes Hubbard
& Reed (Jan. 13, 1991) (counsel for BMI).
17. Telephone interview with Charles Lozow of Hughes Hubbard & Reed (Oct. 1, 1991)
(counsel for BMI).
18. United States v. ASCAP, 1950-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,595, at 63,753-754 (S.D.N.Y.
1950) (VI. Non-Exclusive Licenses, IX. Court Determination of Reasonable Fee).
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ating higher fees from cable entities. This note will examine and suggest
solutions to the problems that remain as a result of BMI's considerable
bargaining power.
I
BMI and ASCAP
A. Overview of BMI and ASCAP
Members formed performing rights societies to enforce the public
performance rights to music because members have more bargaining
power collectively than individually.19 ASCAP is an unincorporated
membership association formed in 1914.20 BMI is a nonprofit corpora-
tion organized in 1939 by members of the radio broadcasting industry
"to counter what they perceived to be ASCAP's exorbitant licensing fees
and unacceptable practices. ' 2 '
BMI and ASCAP together control ninety-five percent of the market
in the United States for performance rights to musical compositions,
making them the two largest performing rights societies in the United
States.22 BMI represents more than 100,000 composers and publishers
and has a repertoire of approximately 1.5 million compositions.23 AS-
CAP represents more than 40,000 members and controls a repertoire of
approximately 3 million compositions. 24 Virtually all musical composi-
tions of any marketable value in the United States are represented by
either BMI or ASCAP.25 Very few compositions are represented by both
BMI and ASCAP; only those songs that are co-authored by a member
from each organization are represented by both.26 Consequently, licen-
19. Buffalo Brdcst. v. ASCAP, 546 F. Supp. 274, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd, 744 F.2d
917 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211 (1985).
20. Id.
21. Jay M. Fujitani, Controlling the Market Power of Performing Rights Societies: An Ad-
ministrative Substitute for Antitrust Regulation, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 103, 106 (1984) (citing A.
LATMAN & R. GORMAN, COPYRIGHT FOR THE EIGHTIES 455, 455-56 (1981)).
22. Valerie Oliver, Many Firms Failing to Pay Piper for Their Use of Licensed Music,
NASHVILLE Bus. J., Mar. 5, 1990, at 1. Smaller performing rights societies exist. The best
known is the Society of European Stage Authors and Composers, Inc. (SESAC). Fujitani,
supra note 21, at 106 n.20 (citing S. SHEMEL & M. KRASILOVSKY, THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC
164-65 (rev. ed. 1977)).
23. Third Amended and Supplemental Verified Complaint at 3, BMI v. HBO, No. 89 Civ.
8579 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 15, 1990).
24. United States v. ASCAP, No. 13-95, slip op. at 4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1989) (In re the
Application of Showtime/The Movie Channel).
25. BMI v. Lifetime Television, No. 89 Civ. 2833, slip op. at 7 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29,
1990).
26. Id.
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sees who regularly perform musical compositions must generally have
licenses from both organizations.27
B. BMI's and ASCAP's Methods of Licensing Performing Rights
BMI and ASCAP grant blanket licenses to numerous types of orga-
nizations, including traditional television and cable television systems.2"
Blanket licenses allow the licensee to perform any song in the performing
rights society's repertoire without having to obtain an individual license
for each song.29 The fee for a blanket license does not depend upon the
quantity or popularity of the songs used-rather, it is a single, negotiated
fee that is usually either a flat rate or a percentage of the licensee's gross
revenue.30 The television or cable company may purchase either a blan-
ket license to cover all of its programming or ask BMI or ASCAP to
grant it a per program blanket license.3I A per program blanket license
lets the licensee use any composition in the performing rights society's
repertoire but the fee is based on only those programs that use BMI or
ASCAP music.
3 2
II
Cable Programmers and Cable Operators
A. Cable Programmers' and Cable Operators' Functions in the Cable
Industry
The cable industry is a two-tiered system comprised of cable pro-
grammers and cable operators. Cable programmers supply program-
ming via satellite to cable operators.33 These cable operators then
retransmit the programming via cables to subscribers. 34 Two types of
cable programmers exist. Basic cable programmers supply the program-
27. Id.
28. See Buffalo Brdcst. v. ASCAP, 546 F. Supp. 274, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd, 744 F.2d
917 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211 (1985); Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Pre-
liminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief Class Action at 3-4, American TV and Communica-
tions Corp. v. BMI, No. 90-0447 (C.D. Cal. filed Jan. 29, 1990).
29. See Buffalo Brdcst., 546 F. Supp. at 277; Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Prelimi-
nary and Permanent Injunctive Relief Class Action at 3-4, American TV and Communica-
tions Corp. v. BMI, No. 90-0447 (C.D. Cal. filed Jan. 29, 1990).
30. Fujitani, supra note 21, at 103, 106 n.15 (citing S. SHEMEL & M. KRASILOVSKY, THIS
BUSINESS OF MUSIC 163 (rev. ed. 1977)). ASCAP's and BMI's consent decrees do not provide
required methods for calculating fees for blanket licenses.
31. United States v. BMI, 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,941, at 83,326 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
(VIII. Discriminatory Rates (B)); United States v. ASCAP, 1950-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1
62,595, at 63,753 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (VII. License Fees (B)).
32. Buffalo Brdcst., 546 F. Supp. at 288.
33. Complaint at 14-15, National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, No. 90-0209, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11389 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
34. Id.
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ming included in the base fee that subscribers pay to access cable televi-
sion.3" Pay cable programmers supply programming that costs
subscribers an additional fee.36
B. Types of Programming
Cable programmers provide two types of programming to cable op-
erators--original and syndicated. Original programming is produced by
the cable programmer itself or independent producers hired by the cable
programmer.37 Syndicated programming is purchased by the cable
programmer from an outside producer, distributor, or syndicator.38
Cable programmers are only one source of cable operators' pro-
gramming. Operators may also retransmit the broadcasts of local or dis-
tant traditional television stations. 39 Additionally, they may transmit
local origination programming and public access programming.' Local
origination programming may be purchased or produced by the operator
for its local channel.41 Public access programming is created by commu-
nity and public groups, the government, or educational groups, and
transmitted by the operator as a community service.42
III
Recent Litigation Involving BMI
A. BMI vs. Basic Cable Programmers
BMI tried to persuade previously unlicensed basic cable program-
mers to purchase blanket licenses for the public performance rights to
music used in their programming.43 In 1988 and 1989, BMI sued three
basic cable programmers for infringement-Rainbow Programming
Services (Rainbow), Lifetime Cable Health Network (Lifetime), and the
Christian Broadcasting Network, Inc. (CBN). 4 Rainbow settled with
35. Third Amended and Supplemental Verified Complaint at 7, BMI v. HBO, No. 89 Civ.
8579 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 15, 1990).
36. Id.
37. National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, Nos. 90-0209, 90-0262, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11389, at *15 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
38. Id.
39. Complaint at 14, National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, No. 90-0209, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11389 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
40. Id. at 14-15.
41. Id. at 14-15 n. 1. Local origination programming also includes commercials the opera-
tor produces and transmits. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 27-28.
44. Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief Class
Action at 20, American TV and Communications Corp. v. BMI, No. 90-0447 (C.D. Cal. filed
Jan. 29, 1990); Complaint at 27-28, National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, No. 90-0209, 1991 U.S.
1991]
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BMI shortly after BMI filed suit.45 Lifetime and CBN counterclaimed,
alleging that BMI's licensing practices violated antitrust law.46
When BMI approached other basic cable programmers about
purchasing blanket licenses, they sued BMI, asking the courts to declare
BMI's practices illegal. The Arts & Entertainment Cable Network (Arts
& Entertainment) filed suit against BMI in the Southern District of New
York.47 Black Entertainment Television (BET) joined The Disney Chan-
nel (Disney), a pay cable programmer, and two trade associations (repre-
senting cable operators) in a suit filed in the District Court for the
District of Columbia.4 The basic cable programmers in these suits
claimed that they have always operated without licenses because they
have been unable to negotiate acceptable fees with BMI.49
The District of Columbia case was decided in favor of BMI in Au-
gust of 1991. 50 Shortly thereafter, Lifetime, CBN, and Arts & Entertain-
ment settled with BMI.5"
B. BMI vs. Pay Cable Programmers
During fee negotiations in the fall of 1989, BMI told Home Box
Office (HBO) that it expected to receive between two and three times
more money for a blanket license than HBO had paid in the past.52 HBO
refused to comply. 3 HBO's blanket license expired and, since a renewal
fee had not been agreed upon, HBO continued to transmit BMI music
Dist. LEXIS 11389 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991). Rainbow is doing business as Bravo, American
Movie Classics, and Prism cable services. Lifetime Cable Health Network is doing business as
Lifetime Television. CBN is also known as the Family Channel. Complaint for Declaratory
Relief, Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief Class Action at 20, American TV and
Communications Corp. v. BMI, No. 90-0447 (C.D. Cal. filed Jan. 29, 1990).
45. COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, Sept. 29, 1989.
46. BMI v. Lifetime TV, No. 89 Civ. 2833, slip op. at 11 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 1990).
47. Telephone interview with Alan J. Hartnick of Colton, Hartnick, Yamin & Sheresky
(Nov. 5, 1990) (counsel for Arts & Entertainment Cable Network); Complaint at 29, National
Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, No. 90-0209, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11389 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
BMI counterclaimed for copyright infringement. Id.
48. See National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, Nos. 90-0209, 90-0262, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11389 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
49. Complaint at 27, National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, No. 90-0209, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11389 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
50. National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, Nos. 90-0209, 90-0262, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11389, at *138 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
51. Telephone interview with Alan J. Hartnick of Colton, Hartnick, Yamin & Sheresky
(Sept. 26, 1991) (counsel for Arts & Entertainment cable Network); Telephone interview with
Charles Lozow of Hughes Hubbard & Reed (Oct. 1, 1991) (counsel for BMI).
52. Complaint at 25, National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, No. 90-0209, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11389 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
53. Id.
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without permission.54 In December, 1989, BMI filed suit against HBO
for this unauthorized use." This was the only suit BMI filed against a
pay cable programmer. BMI and HBO reached a settlement in January,
1991.56
Disney, a party in the District of Columbia case, was the only other
pay cable programmer involved in litigation with BMI. Disney, claiming
that BMI had threatened suit for copyright infringement if it did not
accept increased renewal fees,57 asked the court to declare BMI's de-
mands for higher fees illegal.58 As mentioned previously, the court en-
tered judgment in favor of BMI. 59
C. BMI vs. Cable Operators
Blanket licenses purchased by pay cable programmers have histori-
cally included the right for operators to retransmit the programming to
their viewers.' This is known as "through-to-the-viewer" licensing.61
BMI tried to change this system so that each programmer would have a
license to transmit to the operators and each operator would also have a
license to transmit to the viewer.62 This is called "split" or "dual" licens-
ing." BMI also attempted to require that operators purchase blanket
licenses for local origination and public access programming 64 because
cable operators had never purchased blanket licenses for those types of
65programming.
54. Third Amended and Supplemental Verified Complaint at 10, BMI v. HBO, No. 89
Civ. 8579 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 15, 1990).
55. HBO Sued, supra note 1.
56. National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, Nos. 90-0209, 90-0262, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11389, at *30 n.29 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
57. Third Amended and Supplemental Verified Complaint at 6, BMI v. HBO, No. 89 Civ.
8579 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 15, 1990).
58. Id. at 46-47.
59. National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, Nos. 90-0209, 90-0262, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11389, at *138 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
60. Third Amended and Supplemental Verified Complaint at 6, 24-25, BMI v. HBO, No.
89 Civ. 8579 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 15, 1990).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 24-25; Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive
Relief Class Action at 4, American TV and Communications Corp. v. BMI, No. 90-0447 (C.D.
Cal. filed Jan. 29, 1990).
63. Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief Class
Action at 4, American TV and Communications Corp. v. BMI, No. 90-0447 (C.D. Cal. filed
Jan. 29, 1990).
64. See Third Amended and Supplemental Verified Complaint at 13, BMI v. HBO, No.
89 Civ. 8579 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 15, 1990).
65. Complaint at 23-24, National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, No. 90-0209, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11389 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
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BMI included Manhattan Cable Television (Manhattan), a cable op-
erator, as a defendant in its suit against HBO.6 6 BMI alleged that Man-
hattan was infringing BMI members' copyrights by retransmitting
programming from HBO, a pay cable programmer, because HBO no
longer held a through-to-the-viewer license.67 BMI also claimed that
Manhattan infringed members' copyrights by retransmitting program-
ming from basic cable programmers because basic cable programmers
had never held through-to-the-viewer licenses. 68 Finally, BMI asserted
that Manhattan infringed the copyright of music it used in local origina-
tion programming.69
Cable operators challenged BMI's attempt to establish split licens-
ing en masse. Seventeen cable operators (including Manhattan) sued
BMI in the District Court for the Central District of California.' Two
trade associations representing cable operators, the National Cable Tele-
vision Association, Inc. (NCTA), and the Community Antenna Televi-
sion Association, Inc. (CATA), joined in the suit against BMI in the
District Court for the District of Columbia,"1 requesting that the court
declare BMI's practices and demands illegal.' 2
When BMI and HBO settled, the claim against Manhattan in the
same suit was dropped as part of the agreement.13 Manhattan remains
unlicensed for original and public access programming. However, the
settlement with HBO included a through-to-the-viewer license that cov-
ers Manhattan's retransmission of HBO's programming. 74 The case
brought by the seventeen cable operators in California was also settled as
66. See generally Third Amended and Supplemental Verified Complaint, BMI v. HBO,
No. 89 Civ. 8579 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 15, 1990).
67, Id. at 13'
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief
Class Action, American TV and Communications Corp. v. BMI, No. 90-0447 (C.D. Cal. filed
Jan. 29, 1990).
71. See National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, Nos. 90-0209, 90-0262, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11389 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991). Disney and BET were the other plaintiffs in this suit. Id.
"NCTA is the principal national trade association of cable system operators, whose members
account for approximately 90 percent of the nation's 50 million cable television subscribers....
CATA is a national trade association of cable system operators, and represents over 2,000
cable systems located throughout the United States." Complaint at 10- 11, National Cable TV
Ass'n v. BMI, No. 90-0209, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11389 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
72. See id.
73. Telephone interview with Richard Hirsch of Time-Warner, Inc. (Sept. 26, 1991)
(counsel for HBO).
74. National Cable TV Ass'n v BMI, Nos. 90-0209, 90-0262, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11389, at *30 n.29 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
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part of the HBO settlement. 5 As mentioned previously, the court, in the
case involving the trade associations representing cable operators, en-
tered judgment in favor of BMI.76
IV
Areas of Dispute
A. BMI's and ASCAP's Consent Decrees
1. History of the Consent Decrees
Because they control the performance rights to virtually all musical
compositions in the United States, BMI and ASCAP have been involved
in several suits claiming that their business practices violate antitrust law.
The Justice Department sued BMI for antitrust violations in 1941, and a
consent decree regulating BMI's licensing practices was issued."' This
consent decree was last renegotiated in 1966 following a monopolization
complaint filed in 1964.78 The Justice Department also sued ASCAP for
antitrust violations in 1941, resulting in a similar consent decree regulat-
ing ASCAP's licensing practices.79 ASCAP's consent decree was last re-
negotiated in 1950 due to "complaints relating to the television industry,
successful private litigation against ASCAP by movie theaters, and a
[g]overnment challenge to ASCAP's arrangements with similar foreign
organizations."' ° Therefore, both performing rights societies are regu-
lated by consent decrees which were negotiated before the cable industry
existed.
BMI's and ASCAP's consent decrees contain two similar provisions
that are relevant to the current dispute. First, both performing rights
societies must issue a single license to a "telecasting network" 8'I or "regu-
larly constituted network" which authorizes the retransmission of its
75. Telephone interview with Richard Hirsch of Time-Warner, Inc. (Sept. 26, 1991)
(counsel for HBO).
76. National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, Nos. 90-0209, 90-0262, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11389, at *138 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
77. United States v. BMI, 1940-3 Trade Cas. (CCH) 56,096 (E.D. Wis. 1941).
78. BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 11 n.20; United States v. BMI, 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH)
71,941 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
79. United States v. ASCAP, 1940-3 Trade Cas. (CCH) 56,104 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
80. BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. at 11; United States v. ASCAP, 1950-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
81. United States v. ASCAP, 1950-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,595, at 63,752 (S.D.N.Y.
1950) (V. License Issuance Requirements).
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programming by its affiliates.8 2 Second, neither performing rights society
is allowed to discriminate between similarly situated licensees.8 3
2 Prohibition Against Dual or Split Licensing
Both BMI's and ASCAP's consent decrees require them to offer
"regularly constituted networks" a single license authorizing both the
broadcasting of the network's programming by the network and the si-
multaneous broadcasting by its "affiliates." 4 In 1966 and 1950, when
the consent decrees were entered into respectively, only the three tradi-
tional television networks, ABC, NBC, and CBS, existed. The cable
companies argued that cable programmers are equivalent to "regularly
constituted networks," and that cable operators are equivalent to televi-
sion "affiliates," therefore, BMI and ASCAP must issue through-to-the-
viewer licenses for cable programmers that cover the retransmission of
programming by cable operators. 5
In United States v. ASCAP, 6 ASCAP argued that cable program-
mers and operators differ significantly from television networks and affili-
ates. Therefore, the provision in ASCAP's consent decree prohibiting
split licensing could not be interpreted to apply to the cable industry.8 7
82. United States v. BMI, 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,941, at 83,326 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
(IX. Broadcast Licensing (A)).
83. United States v. ASCAP, 1950-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,595, at 63,752 (S.D.N.Y.
1950) (IV. General Prohibitions (C)); United States v. BMI, 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,941
at 83,326 (VIII. Discriminatory Rates (A)).
84. United States v. BMI, 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 83,326 (IX. Broadcast Licensing
(A)).
85. Complaint at 16-17, National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, No. 90-0209, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11389 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
86. Civ. No. 13-95, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10033, at *51 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 1991) (In re
Turner Broadcasting System).
87. Id. The difference between television networks and affiliates and cable programmers
and operators cited by ASCAP are the following: (1) Television affiliates transmit over-the-air
while cable operators transmit by cable. (2) Television affiliates only provide one channel
while cable operators provide simultaneous programming on numerous channels. (3) There
are more cable program suppliers than traditional networks. (4) In most locations there are at
least three competing television affiliates, whereas there is usually only one cable operator.
(5) Most local television stations are only affiliated with one network while cable operators
obtain programming from a number of cable programmers. (6) Networks pay their affiliates
stations to broadcast network programming, while pay cable programmers usually receive a
share of the operators' subscriber fees, and basic cable programmers usually derive their profit
from both advertising and operators' subscriber fees. (7) No television affiliates own a major-
ity of shares of any network, and networks are prohibited by the FCC from owning and oper-
ating more than five stations. Also, networks are not allowed to own production companies
that supply the network with programming. Contrastingly, the cable industry contains multi-
system operators that own a large number of cable operators and, in some cases, cable pro-
grammers. (8) Television networks distribute their programming exclusively through their
affiliates, while cable programmers distribute some of their programming directly to subscrib-
ers and even through local television stations. (9) Cable operators also retransmit over-the-air
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The court held that none of the differences between television networks
and affiliates and cable programmers and operators presented by ASCAP
were relevant to the issue of whether the split licensing prohibition ap-
plied to cable programmers and operators."8
The court held that the purpose of the provision in ASCAP's con-
sent decree was, "to protect the ultimate users of ASCAP music who
would otherwise be subjected to 'the harassment of suits' if they failed to
comply with ASCAP's fee demands." 9 The court explained,.
"[tielecasting network" is to be read in its functional sense, that is, to
cover the supplying of programming by a packager to another entity
for transmission, under the packager's name, to household televisions,
and should not be limited based on either the particular technology
used to transmit the programs into the homes of the ultimate audience
or the particular financial arrangement existing between the packager
and the local transmitter of the programs.9°
In short, the court held that, because the underlying goal of protecting
the users of ASCAP music from harassing suits does not depend upon
the technical or financial aspects of cable television, the through-to-the-
viewer provision in the consent decree should apply to both traditional
television and cable television.
United States v. ASCAP rejected the views of the Department of Jus-
tice on whether the through-to-the-viewer licensing provision applies to
the cable industry.9' The Department of Justice agreed that cable pro-
grammers could be interpreted as "regularly constituted networks"
under the consent decree. 92 However, the Department reasoned that the
through-to-the-viewer licensing provision should not apply to the cable
industry because it would be stretching the language of the consent de-
cree too far to define cable operators as "affiliates." 93 The court stated
that the differences between cable operators and television affiliates were
no greater than the differences between cable programmers and television
networks.94 Thus, the court held that the Department of Justice's analy-
sis was unreasonable and that the through-to-the-viewer licensing provi-
programming, radio station signals, and home security and alarm services. (10) Television
networks and affiliates must be licensed by the FCC, whereas cable operators are licensed
locally. Id. at *61-80.
88. Id. at *81.
89. Id. at *51.
90. Id. at *51-52.
91. Id. at *95-96. The Department of Justice briefed this issue at the invitation of the
court. Id. at *83.
92. Id. at *88.
93. Id. at *88-89.
94. Id. at *90.
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sion in ASCAP's consent decree does apply to cable programmers and
operators. 95
National Cable Television Association, Inc. (NCTA) v. BM196 held
that BMI's consent decree also requires BMI to grant through-to-the-
viewer licenses to cable programmers. The court relied on the decision in
United States v. ASCAP regarding the similar provision in ASCAP's con-
sent decree.97 The court in NCTA v. BMI agreed that requiring through-
to-the-viewer licenses for the cable industry is clearly within the spirit of
the decree and common sense requires this interpretation.98
3. Prohibition Against Discriminating Among Similarly Situated Licensees
ASCAP's and BMI's consent decrees prohibit them from discrimi-
nating among similarly situated licensees. 99 Cable programmers and op-
erators argued that they are similarly situated to traditional television
networks and affiliates. °° They also claimed that the fees BMI tried to
negotiate with cable programmers and operators were discriminatory be-
cause they would be many times what traditional television networks and
affiliates now pay for blanket licenses.101
The court in NCTA v. BMI never discussed the issue of whether or
not cable programmers and operators are similarly situated to television
networks and affiliates. The court merely held that no violation of BMI's
consent decree's antidiscrimination provision was shown."12
The courts could reasonably find that cable programmers and opera-
tors are similarly situated to television networks and affiliates since they
have been found to be functionally the same for purposes of through-to-
the-viewer licenses. 103 However, the antidiscrimination provision in
BMI's consent decree also provides that,
differentials based upon applicable business factors which justify differ-
ent rates or terms shall not be considered discrimination within the
meaning of this section; and.., nothing contained in this section shall
prevent changes in rates or terms from time to time by reason of
95. Id. at *95-96.
96. Nos. 90-0209, 90-0262, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11389, at *125 (D.D.C. Aug. 16,
1991).
97. Id. at *116-17.
98. Id. at *124.
99. United States v. BMI, 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,941, at 83,326 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
(VIII. Discriminatory Rates (A)).
100. Complaint at 17, National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, No. 90-0209, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11389 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
101. Id.
102. National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, Nos. 90-0209, 90-0262, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11389, at *136 n.93 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
103. Id. at *119 (discussing the holding in United States v. ASCAP, Civ. No. 13-95, 1991
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10033 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 1991) (In re Turner Broadcasting System)).
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changing conditions affecting the market for or marketability of per-
forming rights. 14
Therefore, BMI may argue that higher rates for cable programmers and
operators than for television networks and affiliates are justified by the
differences between the two systems. For example, BMI may argue that,
since a television affiliate only broadcasts one channel while a cable oper-
ator transmits numerous channels,1 °5 a higher licensing rate for a cable
operator is justified. BMI might also argue that, since television net-
works only broadcast through their affiliates but cable programmers
sometimes broadcast directly to subscribers with satellite dishes, 1" a
higher rate for cable programmers is not discriminatory. Finally, BMI
might argue that since cable television has become widespread and ex-
tremely profitable, the marketability of performing rights has been af-
fected, and thus BMI is justified in raising its fees significantly under the
terms of the consent decree. In light of these arguments, it would be
extremely difficult for cable programmers and operators to prove that
BMI's fees are discriminatory.
B. Antitrust Law
1. History of Antitrust Claims Brought by Broadcasters Against BMI and
ASCAP
a. CBS v. ASCAP
Several organizations have challenged the legality of the blanket
licenses BMI and ASCAP issue to both traditional broadcasters and
cable companies. In CBS v. ASCAP, 107 the district court rejected CBS's
arguments that BMI and ASCAP "are unlawful monopolies and that the
blanket license is illegal price fixing, an unlawful tying arrangement, a
concerted refusal to deal, and a misuse of copyrights. ' "'I The court of
appeals agreed with all but one of the district court's holdings." It held
that the blanket license was a form of price fixing that was illegal per se
under section one of the Sherman Act.l10 The Supreme Court reversed,
104. United States v. BMI, 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 71,941, at 83,326 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
(VIII. Discriminatory Rates (A)).
105. United States v. ASCAP, Civ. No. 13-95, 1991 U.S. Dist LEXIS 10033, at *63
(S.D.N.Y. July 11, 1991) (In re Turner Broadcasting System).
106. National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, Nos. 90-0209, 90-0262, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11389, at *11 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
107. BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
108. Id. at 7 (citing CBS v. ASCAP, 337 F. Supp. 394, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); CBS v. AS-
CAP, 400 F. Supp. 737, 781-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, CBS v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir.
1977), rev'd, BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979)).
109. Id. (citing CBS v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, BMI v. CBS, 441
U.S. 1 (1979)).
110. Id.
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holding that the blanket license is not a per se violation of section one of
the Sherman Act but that it is subject to the rule of reason standard often
applied in such cases.
On remand, the Second Circuit explained that "[a] rule of reason
analysis requires a determination of whether an agreement is on balance
an unreasonable restraint of trade, that is, whether its anti-competitive
effects outweigh its pro-competitive effects.""' 2 The court determined
that the blanket license has no anti-competitive effect because it is not a
restraint upon potential competition between musical compositions." 3
This holding was based on the theory that if an alternative opportunity to
acquire the right to publicly perform a musical composition is realisti-
cally available, the blanket license is merely an option for acquiring that
right, not a restraint on trade."14 The court then discussed other ways
CBS could acquire the performing rights to musical compositions.
The court first considered the feasibility of direct licensing. If CBS
used direct licensing, it would have to negotiate for the performance
right for each composition with the individual copyright owners. " I5 CBS
argued that direct licensing was not a viable option because it was al-
ready obligated by agreements for blanket licenses with both BMI and
ASCAP, and therefore direct licenses would be redundant and a waste of
money. In rejecting this argument, the court said that CBS could begin
using direct licenses once its blanket licenses expired." 6 Next, CBS
claimed direct licensing was impractical because it could not negotiate
the large number of necessary agreements. The court rejected this argu-
ment based on evidence that a system to negotiate direct licenses could be
developed even though it might require CBS to expend some time and
money." 7 CBS also claimed that individual copyright owners would be
reluctant to deal with CBS directly because they would rather let BMI
and ASCAP represent them." 8 The court found that this was not true
because evidence suggested individual copyright owners would be eager
to deal directly with CBS. " 9 Finally, CBS said that copyright owners
111. Id. at 8-10, 24-25. The court of appeals defined a per se violation of section one of the
Sherman act as "a practice with such a high likelihood of having unjustifiable anti-competitive
effects that it is condemned under the antitrust laws without the need to assess its effect in a
particular case." CBS v. ASCAP, 620 F.2d 930, 935 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 970
(1981).
112. CBS v. ASCAP, 620 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir. 1980) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 970 (1981).
113. Id. at 934, 938.
114. Id. at 935-36.
115. Id. at 937-38.
116. Id. at 937.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 938.
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would demand unconscionably high fees for their works because, since
the music would already be incorporated into the program, CBS would
be obligated to acquire the performing rights and therefore be placed in a
poor bargaining position. The .court found this claim to be groundless,
pointing out that producers currently negotiate the music recording
rights (known as synch rights) directly with artists after a program is
completed.120 Committing themselves to using certain music before ob-
taining the synch rights has not hindered the producers' bargaining
power. 121 Thus, the court reasoned that CBS's bargaining power would
also not be hindered in similar circumstances. Since all of CBS's argu-
ments against direct licensing failed, the court found it to be a realisti-
cally available alternative to obtaining a blanket license.122
In reaching this result, the court relied not only on the weakness of
.CBS's arguments against direct licensing but also on ASCAP's consent
decree. 123 The court stated that even if CBS attempted direct licensing
and found that it was not feasible, CBS could immediately obtain a re-
newed blanket license because ASCAP would be required to grant one
under the terms of its consent decree. 124 Furthermore, if an acceptable
renewal fee could not be negotiated, a rate court would set one.125 Thus,
CBS would incur little risk by attempting direct licensing.' 26 Although
BMI was also a defendant, the court did not address the facts that BMI
is not required to grant licenses to all applicants and is not subject to a
rate court.127
b. Buffalo Broadcasting v. ASCAP
Another important case challenging BMI and ASCAP's blanket
licenses for broadcasters was Buffalo Broadcasting v. ASCAP. 128 Local
television stations brought an antitrust suit against BMI and ASCAP
claiming that requiring blanket licenses for local television stations un-
reasonably restrained trade. 129 The district court stated that under the
rule of reason analysis, 130 the court must first determine whether the
120. Id.
121. See id.
122. Id. at 938.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See United States v. BMI, 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,941 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
128. 546 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd, 744 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1211 (1985).
129. Id. at 274.
130. See infra notes 175-78 and accompanying text (description of the rule of reason
analysis).
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blanket license restrained competition within the context of music
licenses issued to local television stations.' 3' If there were realistically
available alternatives to the blanket license for local television stations,
then no restraint existed.' 32 Finding that the alternatives were too costly
or inefficient to be realistically available, the court held that blanket
licenses were a restraint on competition.' 33
The district court examined three alternatives to blanket licenses
that local stations could employ. The first alternative was the per pro-
gram license that ASCAP and BMI offer under the terms of their respec-
tive consent decrees. ' 34 A per program license is a blanket license whose
fee is based upon revenue generated only by programs that use protected
music rather than total revenue of the licensee.13 The court rejected this
system as unfeasible because it would require time-consuming and expen-
sive reporting and record-keeping obligations, and because BMI and AS-
CAP charge higher fees for per program licenses than for blanket
licenses.' 36
The second alternative considered was direct licensing.' 37 The court
rejected direct licensing as a realistically available option "because it
would be unreasonably impractical and expensive for local stations to
search for and obtain licenses from thousands of composers and publish-
ers." ' The court said that the record did not support a finding that any
agency would develop to provide the brokerage function necessary for
local television stations to replace blanket licenses with direct
licensing.
The third alternative examined was source licensing. "4 Source li-
censing would require producers or syndicators to obtain performing
rights for the music they incorporate into their movies or program-
ming. 14' Producers currently negotiate for the synch rights to music,' 42
so performance rights to music would be merely an additional right to be
acquired when dealing with the artists. The court found that source li-
censing was not a realistically available alternative because producers
131. Id. at 286.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 296.
134. Id. at 288-89.
135. Id. at 288.
136. Id. at 289.
137. Id. at 289-91.
138. Id. at 290.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 291-93.
141. Id. at 291.
142. See id. at 290.
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would not "willingly change to a source licensing system." '143 The court
based this finding on the belief that producers would resist change and
the conclusion that local television stations lacked the economic clout to
persuade producers to adopt source licensing.4
Consequently, the court concluded that blanket licenses restrained
competition among musical compositions because realistic alternatives to
blanket licenses were not available to local television stations. 145 Since
blanket licenses were found to restrain competition, the second part of
the rule of reason analysis required the court to determine whether the
anticompetitive effect of blanket licenses outweighed the procompetitive
effects. 146 The court found the anticompetitive effect of the blanket li-
cense to be a lack of price competition among individual musical compo-
sitions because all copyrighted music was being "pooled and sold on an
all-or-nothing basis."' 47 The procompetitive effects were nominal sav-
ings in transactional costs, the elimination of the cost of monitoring pro-
grams for unauthorized use, and the flexibility of spontaneous use of
music.148 The district court held that the anticompetitive effect of blan-
ket licenses outweighed the procompetitive effects and that the blanket
license was an unreasonable restraint of trade when issued to local televi-
sion stations. 49 The court enjoined the issuance of blanket licenses to
local television stations, believing that source licensing would result. 5 °
The court of appeals reversed,' 5 ' holding that the blanket licenses
granted to local television stations did not restrain competition among
musical compositions. 152 According to the court, the plaintiff failed to
carry its burden of showing that per program licenses, direct licensing,
and source licensing were not realistically available alternatives to blan-
ket licenses for local television stations. 153
The court of appeals first rejected the district court's finding that per
program licenses were too expensive in comparison to the cost of blanket
licenses.'5 4 The court of appeals found that the district court had errone-
143. Id. at 292.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 293.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 294-96. The court probably meant the ability to use any composition in the
repertoire without fear of infringing a copyright when it listed the flexibility of spontaneous use
of music as a procompetitive effect.
149. Id. at 296.
150. Id.
151. Buffalo Brdcst. v. ASCAP, 744 F.2d 917, 919 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1211 (1985).
152. Id. at 933.
153. Id. at 926-32.
154. Id. at 926.
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ously calculated the difference in rates between the two types of
licenses. 155 Furthermore, the court said that even if the per program
licenses were priced unreasonably high, the rate court could provide
relief. 156
The court of appeals also rejected the district court's finding that
direct licensing would not be feasible for local television stations.' 57 The
district court had found that there was no proof any agency would de-
velop the mechanism required for copyright owners to deal directly with
local television stations.15 s The appellate court stated that the proper
inquiry was whether there was any proof showing that such mechanisms
would not develop.159 The proof offered by the plaintiff that such mecha-
nisms would not develop if local television stations attempted direct li-
censing was inadequate.'6 The court of appeals also maintained that the
argument about the infeasibility of direct licensing was undermined by
the finding that local stations secured direct licenses for music used in
locally produced programs.' 6' Since per program licenses were realisti-
cally available for programming other than local programming,1 62 a
blanket license was not a necessity. 163
Finally, the court of appeals rejected the district court's finding that
source licensing was not a feasible alternative to blanket licensing.' 1
The court of appeals said producers would probably respond positively to
an "aggregate demand from stations willing to pay a reasonable price for
source licensing of music performing rights." 165 The court rejected the
local television stations' argument that producers, who often hold the
155. Id. The district court found that the rates for per program licenses were seven times
higher than the rates for blanket licenses. This was because the per program license rate was
nine percent and the blanket license rate was between one percent and two percent. Id. (citing
Buffalo Brdcst. v. ASCAP, 546 F. Supp. 274, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd, 744 F.2d 917 (2d
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211 (1985)). The court of appeals stated that this did not
support a finding that per program licenses were too costly because the rates were charged
against different bases. "The blanket license rate is applied to a station's total revenue; the
program license rate is applied only to revenue from a particular program." Buffalo Brdcst. v.
ASCAP, 744 F.2d 917, 926 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211 (1985). As aresult, the
blanket license rate was lower because its base included revenue from programs that did not
use music and programs which used music already paid for by the network via through-to-the-
viewer blanket licenses. Id.
156. Id. at 927.
157. Id. at 928-29.
158. Id. at 928.
159. Id. at 928-29.
160. Id. at 929.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 931.
165. Id.
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performance rights to the music in their productions, would be unlikely
to give up the revenue from blanket licenses by engaging in source licens-
ing.166 The court found that the revenue each producer collected from
the blanket licenses was so small that it would not dissuade producers
from adopting source licensing. Therefore this argument failed to per-
suade the court. 167
In summary, the court of appeals held that the blanket license was
not a restraint on trade due to the realistically available alternatives of
per program licensing, direct licensing, and source licensing. Therefore,
under the rule of reason analysis, it was unnecessary for the court to
decide whether the blanket license's anticompetitive effects outweighed
its procompetitive effects.
2. Current Status of Blanket Licenses
The courts have indicated that despite the decisions in CBS v. AS-
CAP and Buffalo Broadcasting v. ASCAP, the practice of issuing blanket
licenses is not invulnerable to attack under antitrust law. In Buffalo
Broadcasting, the court of appeals said, "The fact that CBS did not prove
that blanket licensing of networks restrained competition does not neces-
sarily mean that blanket licensing of local stations may not be shown to
be a restraint.""16 Accordingly, even though cable programmers and op-
erators closely resemble television networks and local stations, theoreti-
cally they could still prove that blanket licenses restrain competition
when applied to them. Indeed, the court stated, "[T]he context in which
the blanket license is challenged can have a significant bearing on the
outcome" of a suit for antitrust violations.16 9
The court in BMI v. Lifetime Television 17 denied summary judg-
ment for BMI on the issue of whether blanket licenses violate antitrust
law for cable programmers, 17 ' but the court never reached the merits of
166. Id.
167. Id. The evidence showed:
[BMI] typically distributes to a publisher between 50¢ and 85c for theme and back-
ground music in a half-hour episode of a syndicated program shown on a single
station; by contrast, the syndication licensing fee can exceed $60,000 for a single
episode of a popular series shown in a major television market. Though some of the
major producers that own music publishing companies have received more that $1
million in annual television distributions of music royalties, those royalties are a
small fraction of their syndication revenue.
Id.
168. Id. at 925.
169. Id. at 933.
170. BMI v. Lifetime TV, 746 F. Supp. 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
171. Id.
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the case because the parties settled.172 In NCTA v. BMI, the court found
that BMI's blanket licensing of cable programmers and operators did not
violate antitrust law.173 This decision was appealed, but, again, the case
settled.174 Consequently, the legality of blanket licenses is still questiona-
ble although the weight of precedent is against a finding that blanket
licenses violate antitrust law.
3. Determining Whether BMI's Activities Violate Antitrust Law
a. The Rule of Reason Analysis
The Supreme Court established the test for determining whether
BMI's blanket licenses violate antitrust law in BMI v. CBS. 175 The Court
held that the blanket license is subject to the rule of reason analysis. 17 6
This analysis first requires courts to look at whether the higher priced
blanket licenses would in any way restrain competition among musical
compositions.' 77 Second, if it is found that blanket licenses would re-
strain competition, the court must determine if the blanket licenses' an-
ticompetitive effects outweigh their procompetitive effects.' 78 The courts
in CBS v. ASCAP 79 and Buffalo Broadcasting v. ASCAP "° held that
blanket licenses do not restrain competition among musical compositions
if realistically available alternatives to blanket licenses exist.
b. Realistically Available Alternatives to Blanket Licenses for Non-
Syndicated Programming
BMI and the cable programmers and operators agree that realisti-
cally available alternatives to blanket licenses exist for non-syndicated
programming. I8  The copyright performance fees for music included in
the broadcasts of local or distant traditional television stations retrans-
mitted by cable operators are paid to a tribunal established under the
1976 Copyright Act, which then distributes the fees to the copyright
172. Telephone interview with Charles Lozow of Hughes Hubbard & Reed (Oct. 1, 1991)
(counsel for BMI).
173. National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, Nos. 90-0209, 90-0262, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11389, at *91 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
174. National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, Nos. 90-0209, 90-0262, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13149, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 24, 1991).
175. 441 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1979).
176. Id.
177. Buffalo Brdcst. v. ASCAP, 546 F. Supp. 274, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd on other
grounds, 744 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211 (1985); CBS v. ASCAP, 620
F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 970 (1981).
178. CBS, 620 F.2d at 934; Buffalo Brdcst., 546 F. Supp. at 286.
179. 620 F.2d at 934.
180. 546 F. Supp. at 286.
181. National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, Nos. 90-0209, 90-0262, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11389, at *22 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
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owners."8 2 The performance rights for music used in original program-
ming produced by cable programmers and local origination program-
ming produced by cable operators can be negotiated directly with the
artists." 3 Direct licensing is possible for the original programming of
cable programmers and operators because the cable companies select the
music used in programming that they themselves produce. 8 4 Thus,
cable programmers and operators have the option of choosing only music
for which they are able to obtain a direct license. Performance rights for
music used in public access programming is obtained by the organiza-
tions that are allowed to use the public access channels.'8 5 The organiza-
tions which produce public access programming usually provide
representations and warranties to the cable operators that the organiza-
tion has obtained the necessary performing rights for all music contained
in the programming. 8 6 Therefore, cable programmers and operators
have at least one realistically available alternative to blanket licenses for
all non-syndicated programming.
c. Realistically Available Alternatives to Blanket Licenses for Syndicated
Programming
Since the performance rights for music contained in all other types
of programming may be obtained through some method other than a
blanket license, the only programming at issue in the recent litigation
was syndicated programming. 8 7 Generally, cable programmers and op-
erators complained that music used in syndicated programming is al-
ready incorporated into the soundtrack, or "in the can," before the cable
programmers and operators purchase the syndicated programming.18 8
Furthermore, the cable programmers and operators are bound by agree-
ments with the syndicators not to delete the music used in the program-
ming.18 9 Consequently, the cable programmers and operators have no
control over the musical content of syndicated programming.
Cable programmers and operators claimed that because they have
no control over the use of music in syndicated programming, it is impos-
sible to obtain the performing rights for music used in syndicated pro-
gramming without purchasing a blanket license. 190 They maintained
182. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 801-810 (1988).
183. National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, Nos. 90-0209, 90-0262, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11389, at *20 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
184. Id.
185. Id. at *20 n.17.
186. Id.
187. Id. at *22.
188. Id. at *42.
189. 1& at *21, *42.
190. Id. at *42.
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that they have no bargaining power in negotiating performing rights
where they have no choice but to obtain the rights in order to transmit
the programming.i9i However, the courts in both NCTA v. BMI and
CBS v. ASCAP found that music "in the can" has never hindered the
negotiation of synch rights, and therefore should not be a stumbling
block for the negotiation of performance rights. 192 Both courts also
found that any restrictions caused by music "in the can" were a result of
either the cable programmers' or television networks' failure to negotiate
the performance rights before the programming was produced, rather
than a result of a blanket license.1 93
Although the courts have found that the "in the can" nature of mu-
sic used in syndicated programming does not limit cable programmers'
and operators' options to blanket licenses, cable programmers and opera-
tors argued that other licensing methods are not reasonably available for
other reasons. These arguments are addressed below.
i. Direct Licensing
Cable programmers and operators maintained that direct licensing
is not a realistically available alternative to blanket licenses for syndi-
cated programming because it would be "unreasonable, impractical, and
unduly expensive for a cable network to search for and obtain licenses
from thousands of individual composers and publishers." 194 A similar
argument was rejected by the court in Buffalo Broadcasting v. ASCAP,
which found no evidence to support the conclusion that an agency would
not develop to handle these transactions.' 95 For example, the Buffalo
Broadcasting court noted that the Harry Fox Agency handles the negoti-
ations of synch rights between producers and individual artists.' 96 The
court in NCTA v. BMI stated that, "an economic expert testified persua-
sively that the required intermediaries would arise"' 97 to handle direct
licensing negotiations, and that the fact that the Harry Fox Agency nego-
tiated all synchronization rights supported this conclusion.' 98
Cable programmers and operators also stated that "a copyright
owner would have no incentive to license its work at a price below that
191. Id. at *77.
192. Id. at *79-81 (citing CBS v. ASCAP, 620 F.2d 930, 938 (2d Cir. 1980)).
193. Id.
194. Id. at *31.
195. Buffalo Brdcst. v. ASCAP, 744 F.2d 917, 928 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1211 (1985).
196. Id.
197. National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, Nos. 90-0209, 90-0262, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 11389, at
*64 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
198. Id.
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which it receives from BMI for each performance." '99 In fact, HBO at-
tempted direct licensing for some of its programming and found that
publishers insisted on receiving at least the same amount as they would
through a blanket license.2' Nevertheless, NCTA v. BMI did not find
that the publishers' demand for the minimal equivalent of a blanket li-
cense fee made direct licensing an unrealistic alternative.2 °1 Instead, the
court found that HBO's conclusions as to the feasibility of direct licens-
ing were "largely speculative 20 2 and, the fact that HBO's attempts at
direct licensing began after BMI filed suit against it "call[ed] into ques-
tion the results obtained. 20 3
Cable programmers and operators also claimed that "[c]opyright
owners prefer the quiet life conferred by the blanket licensing system to
the risks of a competitive market. '2 °4 Yet, for years, copyright owners
have negotiated synch rights directly with producers in a competitive
market. Therefore, the risks cannot be overwhelming.20 5 In CBS v. AS-
CAP, the court of appeals described the argument that copyright owners
would refuse to negotiate directly With television networks as the "disin-
clination issue. ' 2°' The court found that "if CBS were to seek direct
licensing, 'copyright proprietors would wait at CBS' door'" in order to
have their music performed by a national television network. 20 7 Simi-
larly, the court in NCTA v. BMI found that music publishers were will-
ing to issue direct licenses to cable programmers and operators when
asked.20 8
Although the court in NCTA v. BMI held that direct licensing was a
realistic alternative to blanket licenses for cable programmers,2 °9 the
court also held that direct licensing was unrealistic for cable operators.2 '0
The court found that cable operators lack control over syndicated pro-
gramming because they do not select the programming and they are con-
199. Complaint at 31-32, National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, No. 90-0209, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11389 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
200. National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, Nos. 90-0209, 90-0262, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11389, at *61-62 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
201. Id. at *62.
202. Id.
203. Id. at *63.
204. Complaint at 31, National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, No. 90-0209, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11389 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
205. CBS v. ASCAP, 620 F.2d 930, 937 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 970 (1981).
206. 620 F.2d at 937.
207. Id. at 938 (quoting CBS v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp. 737, 779 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd,
CBS v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, BMI v. ASCAP, 441 U.S. 1 (1979)).
208. National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, Nos. 90-0209, 90-0262, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11389, at *63 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
209. Id. at *65.
210. Id. at *70.
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tractually bound to retransmit the programming without alterations.21
Furthermore, cable operators transmit "up to several dozen different
cable program services, each with up to hundreds of syndicated pro-
grams containing BMI music-amounting in some cases to tens of
thousands of compositions every month." '212 Thus, the court held that
direct licensing would be too cumbersome and, therefore, unrealistic for
cable operators because of the magnitude of syndicated programming
transmitted by the cable operators and the lack of control over that
213programming.
ii. Source Licensing
The cable programmers and operators argued that source licensing
is not a realistic alternative to blanket licenses for syndicated program-
ming because syndicators are disinclined to negotiate source licensing. 214
Cable programmers and operators claimed that syndicators have no mo-
tivation for offering source licensing because the industry standard is
blanket licensing.21 5 Cable programmers and operators argued that since
they cannot obtain source licensing from any syndicators, syndicators are
not at risk of losing customers to their competitors for not offering source
licensing.216 The court in NCTA v. BMI stated that the cable program-
mers and operators ignore the nature of supply and demand.21 7 The
court found that, "if cable performing rights were demanded, the syndi-
cation market would provide them to avoid the risk of losing sales."
218
Cable programmers and operators also claimed that syndicators are
disinclined to negotiate performing rights with individual artists because
syndicators often receive additional profits from blanket licenses.219
Some syndicators receive these profits because they own the copyrighted
music used in the programs they produce, are members of BMI or AS-
CAP, and therefore receive royalty payments for their music when their
programs are transmitted by cable programmers and operators.22 ° Cable
programmers and operators argued that "it would be commercially im-
practicable and prohibitively costly for the cable networks to attempt to
induce a change in current industry practice, in circumstances where eve-
211. Id. at *69-70.
212. Id. at *69.
213. Id. at *70.
214. Id. at *75.
215. Id. at *47.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Complaint at 22, National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, No. 90-0209, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11389 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
220. Id.
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ryone except the cable program services stands to gain from preserving
the status quo. "221
The court, in Buffalo Broadcasting v. ASCAP, rejected a similar ar-
gument made by local television stations.222 While local television sta-
tions claimed that syndicators would gain by allowing blanket licensing
to continue, the court said that, "[t]he undisputed evidence shows that
[ASCAP royalties received by syndicators] are far too small to persuade
syndicators to refuse to undertake source licensing in the face of reason-
able offers."' 223 The court in NCTA v. BMI found that "the amount of
such royalties, even in the aggregate, is minuscule in caparison to the
dollar figures involved in syndicated programming transactions. '224 The
NCTA v. BMI court held that the royalties paid by BMI to syndicators
are not a barrier to source licensing.225
In summary, cable companies lack evidence that source licensing is
not feasible. Like the plaintiffs in Buffalo Broadcasting v. ASCA P,226 the
cable companies have not offered any proof of serious attempts to negoti-
ate source licensing with producers.227 Consequently, there is no evi-
dence that, if cable programmers and operators were to approach
syndicators with reasonable offers for the performance rights of musical
compositions, syndicators would be unwilling to establish source licens-
ing as the industry standard.
Unlike direct licensing, the court in NCTA v. BMI found that source
licensing is a realistic alternative for cable operators as well as program-
mers. 82 Although cable operators have less direct contact with syndica-
tors, the court found that source licensing is available to cable operators
through cable programmers.229 When negotiating performance rights
through source licensing, cable programmers could obtain the perform-
ance rights for both the transmission from the cable programmer to the
cable operators and the retransmission from the cable operator to the
subscribers. The court in NCTA v. BMI found that cable programmers
would probably agree to negotiate the performing rights for cable opera-
tors because usually only one cable operator exists in any geographical
221. Id. at 30.
222. 744 F.2d 917, 929-32 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211 (1985).
223. Id. at 931.
224. National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, Nos. 90-0209, 90-0262, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11389, at *90 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
225. Id. at *91.
226. 744 F.2d 917, 930-31 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211 (1985).
227. National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, Nos. 90-0209, 90-0262, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11389, at *75-76 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
228. Id. at *70-71.
229. Id.
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location.230 Thus, if a cable programmer wants to reach a particular geo-
graphical location, it must reach an agreement with the only operator in
that area.
iii. Per Program Licensing
As mentioned previously, per program licenses grant a licensee the
right to perform any music in the issuer's repertoire for a fee that is based
on the revenue generated only by those programs that contain such mu-
sic."' As with blanket licenses, the cost of the per program license does
not depend upon the amount or quality of the music used in the
232programming.
Cable programmers and operators argued that per program licenses
are not a realistic alternative to blanket licenses because they are more
expensive than blanket licenses.233 BMI offered per program licenses at a
rate of 4.5% of cable programmers' or operators' total revenue multi-
plied by the fraction of the programming that used BMI music. 234 BMI
offered blanket licenses at a rate of 1% of total revenue.235 Thus,
whether the cost for per program licensing would exceed the cost for a
blanket license would depend upon the amount of programming carrying
BMI music. If approximately 22% or less of a cable programmer's or
operator's programming used music in BMI's repertoire, then per pro-
gram licensing would be cheaper at these rates.
The court in NCTA v. BMI found an absence of evidence indicating
that per program licenses are not realistically available alternatives to
blanket licenses because cable programmers and operators never at-
tempted to negotiate the fees for per program licenses.236 Cable pro-
grammers' and operators' argument that per program licenses are too
expensive is based on the first offer made by BMI.237 Cable programmers
and operators failed to ascertain what the cost for per program licenses
would be if they were seriously pursued.238 The court also noted that
230. Id. at *73.
231. Id. at *65.
232. Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief Class
Action at 28-29, American TV and Communications Corp. v. BMI, No. 90-0447 (C.D. Cal.
filed Jan. 29, 1990).
233. National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, Nos. 90-0209, 90-0262, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11389, at *66-67 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at *67.
237. Id.
238. Id.
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cable programmers and operators failed to show that BMI's suggested
prices for per program licenses exceeded their value.239
The court in Buffalo Broadcasting v. ASCAP also found per program
licenses to be a realistically available alternative for two reasons. 2, °
First, the plaintiffs had not proven that per program licenses were unrea-
sonably expensive because no evidence was offered to show that per pro-
gram licenses failed to reflect the market value of music or that the
blanket license was not actually priced at a bargain rate.241 Second, the
court stated that ASCAP's rate court would enforce reasonable fees for
both blanket and per program licenses.242 This rationale does not apply
to BMI because BMI is not bound by a rate court and can attempt to set
its fees higher than the true market value for blanket licenses.243 Cable
programmers and operators must rely strictly on negotiations to obtain
reasonable fees for per program licenses from BMI, but cable program-
mers and operators have not shown that this is impossible. Conse-
quently, without further evidence to the contrary, per program licensing
is another realistically available alternative to blanket licenses.
Per program licenses may also be useful to cable programmers and
operators when used in conjunction with other licensing methods. If, for
example, a cable programmer or operator could not negotiate direct or
source licenses for a program, then it could purchase a per program li-
cense for that program. Both BMI and ASCAP offer per program
licenses, 2 " therefore per program licenses insure that cable programmers
239. Id. at *68 n.54.
240. Buffalo Brdcst. v. ASCAP, 744 F.2d 917, 926-28 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1211 (1985).
241. Id. at 927.
242. Id. The court in CBS v. ASCAP, 620 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
970 (1981), also relied on the fact that ASCAP was subject to a rate court in finding that CBS
had a realistically available alternative to the blanket license. The court said:
Pervading these assessments of each of the CBS contentions of alleged barriers to
direct licensing is one indisputable fact that perhaps overshadows all others. If CBS
were to forgo the blanket license, seek direct licenses, and then discover, contrary to
the facts found by Judge Lasker, that a competitive market among copyright owners
was not a feasible alternative to the blanket license, it would be entitled, under the
consent decree, to assure itself of continued performing rights by immediately ob-
taining a renewed blanket license. Indeed, Paragraph IX of the ASCAP decree per-
mits CBS to use any music covered by a license application, without payment of fee,
subject to whatever fees are subsequently negotiated or determined to be reasonable
by the [rate] court if negotiations fail.
Id. at 938. Because the court found that CBS could feasibly obtain performing rights through
direct licensing, this language was merely dictum. The rate court merely provided insurance
in the event the court's findings proved erroneous. Id.
243. See United States v. BMI, 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,941 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
244. United States v. ASCAP, 1950-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 62,595, at 63,753 (S.D.N.Y.
1950) (VII. License Fees (B)); United States v. BMI, 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,941, at
83,326 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (VIII. Discriminatory Rates (B)). In United States v. ASCAP, Civ.
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and operators can obtain performance rights for programming if alterna-
tive methods fail. The availability of per program licenses thus under-
mines cable programmers' and operators' arguments that converting to
another licensing method entails the risk of failing to secure performance
rights.245
d. Second Part of the Rule of Reason Analysis
The NCTA v. BMI court found that direct licensing, source licens-
ing, or per program licensing are realistically available alternatives to
blanket licensing for the music used in syndicated programming. 24 6
Thus, blanket licenses sold to cable programmers and operators are not a
restraint of trade and a violation of antitrust law.24 7
Under the rule of reason analysis applied in antitrust cases, if blan-
ket licenses were found to be a restraint of trade, the court would have to
determine whether the anticompetitive effects of blanket licenses out-
weigh their procompetitive effects. 24 The NCTA v. BMI court stated
that, even if it had found blanket licenses to be a restraint of trade, the
anticompetitive effects of blanket licenses do not outweigh their procom-
petitive effects.2 9
The cable programmers and operators argued that the anticompeti-
tive effect of blanket licenses is the elimination of price competition
among musical compositions. 2 0 The court said that, since source licens-
ing and direct licensing are available alternatives, price competition
could exist if cable programmers and operators chose to use these meth-
ods of licensing. 251 Additionally, the cable programmers and operators
failed to show that blanket licenses have inflated the price of musical
compositions above what the price would be without blanket licenses.252
No. 13-95, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10033, at * 130 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 1991), the court held that
ASCAP is required to grant per program licenses to cable programmers. In NCTA v. BMI
Nos. 90-0209, 90-0262, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11389, at *65 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991), the
court found that, although it is unclear whether BMI is required to grant per program licenses
under its consent decree, BMI always has offered per program licenses to every cable program-
mers that has asked for one.
245. National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, Nos. 90-0209, 90-0262, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11389, at *66 n.53 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
246. See generally id.
247. Id. at *91.
248. CBS v. ASCAP, 620 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 970 (1981);
Buffalo Brdcst. v. ASCAP, 546 F. Supp. 274, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd, 744 F.2d 917 (2d
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211 (1985).
249. National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, Nos. 90-0209, 90-0262, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11389, at *91 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
250. Id. at *93.
251. Id. at *95.
252. Id.
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The NCTA court found that a procompetitive effect of blanket
licenses "is the tremendous efficiency of the blanket license, which, ulti-
mately, reduces costs to buyers and maximizes output." '53 Blanket
licenses eliminate the costs of marketing songs individually, including ne-
gotiating prices, monitoring the performance of compositions, auditing
licensees, and bookkeeping. 254 The court noted that without blanket
licenses, output would be reduced because individual composers and
publishers could not afford to perform these tasks.2 55 In addition, blan-
ket licenses promote the goals of copyright law by protecting copyright
holders from infringement and providing them with compensation.2 56
Consequently, the procompetitive effects of blanket licenses, including
the reduction of costs, the maximization of output, and the promotion of
copyright law, outweighs the possible anticompetitive effect of a lack of
price competition. Therefore, even if there were no realistically available
alternatives to blanket licenses, they would not be a violation of antitrust
law under the rule of reason analysis.
C. Copyright Law
1. Transmission Between a Cable Programmer and a Cable Operator
The Copyright Act of 1976 provides copyright owners the exclusive
right to control the public performance of the copyrighted work.
25 7
Cable programmers claimed that their transmissions to cable operators
are not public performances within the meaning of copyright law and
are, therefore, not copyright infringement.2 58
In BMI v. Lifetime Television, the defendants questioned whether a
transmission from a cable programmer to a cable operator was a public
performance, because the only parties receiving the transmission were
the operators, who then retransmitted it to their subscribers.2 59 In
resolving this question, the Lifetime court relied on David v. Showtime/
253. Id. at 103.
254. Id. at *104.
255. Id4
256. Id. at *109.
257. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1988). The 1976 Copyright Act says that to perform a work
publicly means
to perform... it at any place open to the public or at any place where a substantial
number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances
is gathered or to transmit.., a performance.., to the public, by means of any device
or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance
... receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at
different times.
Id.
258. See e.g., National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, Nos. 90-0209, 90-0262, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11389, at *128 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
259. BMI v. Lifetime TV, No. 89 Civ. 2833, slip op. at 17-18 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 1990).
1991] PERFORMING RIGHTS TO MUSIC
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
The Movie Channel, in which the plaintiffs (ASCAP members) claimed
that Showtime and The Movie Channel had infringed the plaintiffs' copy-
rights by publicly performing their music in their pay cable programming
without authorization.2 "° Showtime and The Movie Channel are pay
cable programmers who transmit their programs to cable operators, who
then retransmit the programs to individual subscribers. 6 '
The court in David v. Showtime/The Movie Channel considered
"whether the transmission of copyrighted material to an intermediary for
ultimate transmission to the public falls within the scope of the Copy-
right Act." '2 62 The court held that, as a matter of law, the transmission
to the cable operator by a cable programmer is a public performance.263
The decision relied on the House Report accompanying the Copyright
Act of 1976 in determining that the legislative intent was to broadly de-
fine "public performance."' 4 The court said that "Congress intended
the definitions of 'public' and 'performance' to encompass each step in
the process by which a protected work wends its way to its audience. 265
Using this analysis, cable operators were considered "public" and the
transmission to them by cable programmers was a public performance.
The result is that cable programmers and cable operators are indepen-
dently liable for copyright infringement unless they purchase the rights
to perform the musical compositions in the programming they transmit.
In Coleman v. ESPN, Inc., the court stated that, "[t]ransmissions by
a cable network or service to local cable companies who in turn transmit
to individual cable subscribers constitute 'public performance' by the net-
260. David v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, 697 F. Supp. 752, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
261. Id. at 758.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 759.
264. Id. at 758 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 63, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5676-77).
265. Id. at 759. The court quoted the House Report on its discussion of what constitutes a
public performance:
Under the definitions of "perform," "display," "publicly," and "transmit" in section
101, the concepts of public performance and public display cover not only the initial
rendition or showing, but also any further act by which that rendition or showing is
transmitted or communicated to the public. Thus, for example: a singer is performing
when he or she sings a song; a broadcasting network is performing when it transmits
his or her performance (whether simultaneously or from records); a local broadcaster
is performing when it transmits the network broadcast; a cable television system is
performing when it retransmits the broadcast to its subscribers; and any individual is
performing whenever he or she plays a phonorecord embodying the performance or
communicates the performance by turning on a receiving set. Id. at 758 (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 63, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5676-77 (emphasis added)).
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work under [The Copyright Act]." '26 6 The court in NCTA v. BMI agreed
with the decisions in David v. Showtime/The Movie Channel and Cole-
man v. ESPN, Inc. and held that the Disney and BET had publicly per-
formed music controlled by BMI and were liable for infringement.267
2. Misuse of Copyright As a Defense to BMI's Infringement Actions
Although copyright owners have the exclusive right to authorize
public performances of their music,"' misuse of that right may be a de-
fense to a copyright infringement action.269 For example, in BMI v. Life-
time Television, the defendant alleged copyright misuse as a counterclaim
to BMI's infringement action.270 The court refused to grant BMI sum-
mary judgment because if the plaintiffs could show that BMI "used its
legal monopoly power to force cable program services to purchase the
blanket license at exorbitant prices[,] ... this would constitute an illegal
extension of BMI's monopoly." '271 The court was unable to find a single
copyright infringement case where recovery was denied due to misuse of
copyright.272 Nevertheless, the court stated that recent decisions by
other courts supported the doctrine of copyright misuse as an affirmative
defense.273
The court in NCTA v. BM1274 also recognized the defense of copy-
right misuse. However, the court rejected the defense as applied to BMI
because the cable programmers and operators failed to show that BMI
"illegally extended its monopoly or otherwise violated the public policy
underlying copyright law."'275 The cable programmers' and operators'
defenses of, not only copyright misuse, but equitable estoppel and un-
clean hands, depended on a finding that BMI had violated either its con-
sent decree or antitrust law. 276  As discussed previously, cable
266. Coleman v. ESPN, Inc., No. 90-36327, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6101, at *9 (S.D.N.Y.
May 7, 1991).
267. National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, Nos. 90-0209, 90-0262, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11389, at *130 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
268. 17 U.S.C § 106(4) (1988).
269. BMI v. Lifetime TV, No. 89 Civ. 2833, slip op. at 17 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 1990).
270. Id. at 15.
271. Id. at 16-17. The court found recovery on the issue of copyright misuse to be remote.
Id. at 17.
272. Id. at 16.
273. Id.
274. Nos. 90-0209, 90-0262, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11389, at *132 (D.D.C. Aug. 16,
1991).
275. Id.
276. Id. at *132-36.
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programmers and operators failed to show that BMI had violated either
its consent decree or antitrust law.2 77
V
The Remaining Problems
A. BMI's Excessive Bargaining Power in Negotiating Blanket License Fees
Cable programmers and operators have failed through litigation to
stop BMI from increasing its fees. The only victory for the cable compa-
nies is that the courts have held that BMI's and ASCAP's consent de-
crees do not allow BMI and ASCAP to force dual licensing on cable
programmers and operators. Cable programmers must still obtain per-
formance rights to music used in original and sy ndicated programming
and cable operators must obtain performance rights to music used in lo-
cal origination programming. Therefore, pay cable programmers and
cable operators must either purchase a blanket license at higher rates or
find some other method of licensing in order to avoid continuing liability
for infringement.
Two important differences between the BMI and ASCAP consent
decrees give BMI an advantage in negotiating blanket licenses with cable
programmers and operators. First, ASCAP's consent decree requires
ASCAP to issue a blanket license to any user of ASCAP's music who
applies for one.27s BMI's consent decree does not contain such a provi-
sion. Thus, BMI can refuse to grant a blanket license if an acceptable fee
cannot be negotiated. 279 BMI can then sue parties who continue to use
its music, after negotiations have broken down, for copyright infringe-
ment. This gives BMI a negotiating advantage, since the threat of a law-
suit could influence licensees' decisions to accept higher fees.
The second important difference between the two consent decrees is
that only ASCAP's consent decree provides for a rate court.280 The rate
court sets a reasonable license fee if ASCAP and the applicant cannot
agree on one within sixty days of the beginning of negotiations.2"' AS-
CAP is then required to offer a comparable fee to similarly situated appli-
cants who apply after the court's determination.282 ASCAP is thus
strongly motivated to successfully negotiate with each applicant so that it
277. See National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, Nos. 90-0209, 90-0262, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11389 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
278. United States v. ASCAP, 1950-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,595, at 63,753 (S.D.N.Y.
1950) (VI. Non-Exclusive Licenses).
279. See United States v. BMI, 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 71,941 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
280. United States v. ASCAP, 1950-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,595, at 63,754 (S.D.N.Y.
1950) (IX. Court Determination of Reasonable Fee).
281. Id. (IX. Court Determination of Reasonable Fee (A)).
282. Id. (IX. Court Determination of Reasonable Fee (C)).
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will not be bound by a court-determined fee for multiple applicants.
Since BMI is not subject to a rate court, BMI does not have as strong a
motivation to reach an agreement' with each applicant.
B. ASCAP's Ability to Increase Its Fees Based on Fees Negotiated by BMI
If cable programmers and operators agree to substantially higher
fees for BMI's blanket licenses, ASCAP may also be able to increase its
rates. ASCAP's rate court recently based its determination of a reason-
able licensing fee for a cable company on BMI's fee to that same com-
pany.2 3 Therefore, if cable programmers and operators agree to BMI's
higher rates, a precedent may be set for future rate court determinations
of the reasonableness of ASCAP's fees.
C. Cable Programmers and Operators Fear the Risk of Alternative
Licensing Methods
Cable programmers and operators probably fear the risk of switch-
ing from blanket licensing to another licensing method. They are pre-
sumably concerned that changing their licensing method individually
will be too costly and render them unable to compete with other cable
programmers and operators. Then, if they wish to renew their blanket
licenses, BMI will have even more bargaining power. The cable compa-
nies probably want the courts to declare blanket licenses illegal so that all
cable companies would be forced to develop another form of licensing at
the same time and none of them would be at a competitive disadvantage.
However, since there is currently no basis for the courts to declare blan-
ket licenses illegal, cable companies cannot rely on this strategy to
change the industry standard.
VI
Proposal
A. Organize Cable Programmers and Operators to Persuade Syndicators to
Negotiate Source Licensing
Cable programmers and operators claim that source licensing is not
a realistically available alternative to blanket licenses because only cable
programmers and operators have any motivation to change the status
quo.2" 4 While this may be true, cable programmers and operators under-
estimate their power to effect such a change. Although syndicators
might be unwilling to purchase the performing rights for music if only a
283. ASCAP v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, No. 90-6034, slip op. at 11-12 (2d Cir.
Aug. 27, 1990).
284. Complaint at 30, National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, No. 90-0209, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11389 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
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single cable company proposed doing so, if a large number of cable com-
panies requested that syndicators negotiate performing rights when they
negotiate synch rights, syndicators would probably comply in order to
continue marketing their product to the cable industry.
The effectiveness of the cable industry's bargaining power depends
upon organization. The two national trade associations of cable system
operators mentioned previously, the National Cable Television Associa-
tion, Inc. (NCTA) and Community Antenna Television Association, Inc.
(CATA), sued BMI for a declaratory judgment that BMI's licensing
practices are illegal.2 5 If these organizations can represent cable opera-
tors in litigation, they can also represent their members in negotiations
with syndicators for source licensing.
Cable programmers and operators are also well organized in another
sense. The ownership of cable programmers and operators is remarkably
consolidated. Several multi-system operators (MSOs) own numerous
cable operators, and some MSOs own or control some of the cable pro-
grammers.28 6 In fact, "fifteen of the largest MSO's own 60 percent of all
[cable operators] and the fifty largest own nearly 82 percent. ' 287 These
large, powerful MSOs could pressure syndicators into source licensing of
performing rights to music in syndicated programming. Together, cable
programmers and operators, either in the form of trade associations,
MSOs, or some other structure, have the necessary bargaining power to
convince syndicators to negotiate source licensing in exchange for a rea-
sonable price.
B. Petition the Justice Department to Amend BMI's Consent Decree to
Substantially Comply with ASCAP's
The courts have held that source licensing is a realistic alternative to
blanket licensing.288 The suits filed by the cable programmers and opera-
tors against BMI indicate that the cable programmers and operators
would prefer source licensing. 2 9 The facts indicate that cable program-
mers and operators could demand source licensing if they were so in-
clined. However, the cable programmers and operators chose to sue
BMI rather than to pursue the source licensing alternative.
285. See Complaint, National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, No. 90-0209, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11389 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
286. United States v. ASCAP, Civ. No. 13-95, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10033, at *75
(S.D.N.Y. July 11, 1991) (In re Turner Broadcasting System).
287. Id. at *75 n.16.
288. See, e.g., Buffalo Brdcst. v. ASCAP, 744 F.2d 917, 931 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1211 (1985).
289. See, e.g., Complaint at 18-21, 39-40, National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, No. 90-0209,
1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11389 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
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Cable programmers and operators may not have wanted the courts
to declare blanket licenses illegal. Instead, they might simply have been
resisting BMI's demand for higher license fees in the hope that they
could negotiate lower fees with BMI in settlement proceedings. Perhaps
cable programmers and operators are not as interested in source licensing
as they suggest, or at least not enough of them are interested to effec-
tively pursue such a change. It may also be true that blanket licenses are
still the most cost effective method for cable operators to cover their mu-
sic licensing needs. Even with source licensing, cable programmers and
operators would be required to negotiate performing rights for non-syn-
dicated programming, such as local origination programming.
If this is true, and blanket licenses are still the most effective system,
cable programmers and operators should petition the Justice Department
to amend BMI's consent decree to include the same limitations as those
to which ASCAP is subject.29" Specifically, cable programmers and op-
erators should request that BMI be required to issue a blanket license to
all applicants and be subject to a rate court that would determine a rea-
sonable licensing fee if the parties could not successfully negotiate a fee
within a reasonable time.
The Justice Department recently denied a petition by BMI for a rate
court.291 Although this is an era of deregulation, the Justice Department
should reconsider and grant BMI's petition, or a petition by cable pro-
grammers and operators, because requirements that BMI issue blanket
licenses to all applicants and submit to a rate court have several advan-
tages. These amendments would end long and expensive antitrust litiga-
tion.292 BMI would not be able to increase fees significantly above those
charged by ASCAP, with a resulting precedent for ASCAP to rely upon
in future appearances before a rate court. Furthermore, if cable pro-
290. Precedent exists for amending consent decrees. In Buffalo Brdcst. v. ASCAP, the
court said that "[t]he restraining nature of the ASCAP blanket license, as applied to movie
theater operators, prompted the Government to re-open the 1941 ASCAP consent decree and
secure in 1950 a significant amendment." 744 F.2d 917, 922 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1211 (1985). The court also stated, "if the blanket license was serving to restrain trade
unreasonably in violation of the antitrust laws, the stations' remedy was to urge the Depart-
ment of Justice to seek modification of the consent decree or to initiate a private suit." Id. at
923 (citing United States v. ASCAP, 31 F.2d 117, 124 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
997 (1964) (In re Application of Shenandoah Valley Brdcst., Inc.)).
291. National Cable TV Ass'n v. BMI, Nos. 90-0209, 90-0262, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11389, at *6 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
292. The antitrust claim in CBS v. ASCAP took over 11 years to reach a final decision.
CBS first filed suit in 1969. Its claim was dismissed in 1975. The court of appeals reversed the
dismissal in 1977. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals decision in 1979. The
court of appeals entered a decision upon remand in 1980 and certiorari was denied by the
Supreme Court in 1981. Buffalo Brdcst. v. ASCAP, 744 F.2d 917, 923-24 (2d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1211 (1985).
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grammers and operators decided to experiment with alternative licensing
methods, they would have the security of a guaranteed blanket license at
a reasonable rate to fall back on.
Establishing a rate court for BMI would benefit all of the parties
involved. Cable programmers and operators who have never held BMI
blanket licenses could purchase them at a reasonable fee and avoid copy-
right infringement liability. Members of BMI would benefit because they
would receive royalties from cable programmers and operators that have
been unlicensed in the past. Potential members would not be deterred
from joining BMI because royalty payments would be consistently dis-
tributed under blanket licenses if they were not constantly disputed and
fees were not tied up in litigation.29 a Thus the advantages of an amend-
ment to BMI's consent decree to both the cable industry and BMI should
convince the Justice Department to grant such an amendment.
VII
Conclusion
The cable industry has been ineffective in its reaction to BMI's and
ASCAP's attempts to increase profits from cable television. Cable pro-
grammers and operators claimed that BMI's licensing attempts were ille-
gal under its consent decree, antitrust law, and copyright law. The
consequence of long, expensive, and unnecessary litigation of these
claims will be an ultimate determination in BMI's favor. Instead, cable
programmers and operators should organize and convince programming
syndicators to change the industry standard for music performance
rights from blanket licensing to source licensing. The cable industry has
the bargaining power to persuade syndicators to negotiate source licenses
in exchange for reasonable compensation for the service.
If cable programmers and operators prefer reasonably priced blan-
ket licenses to source licensing, they should petition the Justice Depart-
ment to amend BMI's consent decree to conform to ASCAP's consent
decree. The Justice Department should grant the petition, even though
the trend is towards deregulation, because the circumstances in this dis-
pute warrant it. BMI's consent decree should require BMI to issue a
blanket license to all applicants and to submit fee disputes to a rate court.
These amendments would benefit all of the parties involved.
293. Telephone interview with Richard Hirsch of Time-Warner, Inc. (Nov. 5, 1990) (coun-
sel for HBO).
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